This paper investigates the effect of ownership structure on the cost efficiency of Australian building societies using the stochastic econometric frontier approach. Contrary to the expense preference hypothesis, mutually owned societies were found to be, on average, more cost efficient than those under stock ownership. Moreover, mutual and stock-owned societies have significantly different cost functions or production technologies. The results are consistent with U.S. results of Mester {1993].
INTRODUCTION
With banking deregulation in the 1980s undermining the competitive position of permanent building societies vis-a-vis banks, the building society industry has recently undergone significant structural change. While several societies have exited the industry through closure, either merging with stronger societies or converting to banks, there has also been a significant number of societies converting from mutual to share owned organisations (see Palestrant [1995, p 31] ). A number of explanations for these conversions have been advanced including the inability of mutually owned societies to raise external capital, such as ordinary share issues, to meet regulatory capital requirements or to provide a source of capital to fund growth opportunities.
Another possibility is that the agency problems associated with the diffuse ownership characteristics of mutuals has increased the relative attractiveness of share ownership. Ownership diffusion arises because each depositor, known as a member, is considered to be an owner having only one vote at annual meetings regardless of deposit size (see Thomson [1995,p 6 and 10]) . No residual claim is attached to a member's ownership rights, making them non-transferable. Moreover, members do not normally receive dividends or capital gains on their ownership shares.
According to Williamson's [1963] expense preference behaviour theory, managers who are not owners of a firm may prefer to maximise their own utility rather than that of the firm's owners. A number of mechanisms are available which may serve to limit discretionary managerial behaviour including market based disciplines and active monitoring of managerial behaviour by the firm's owners 1 . However, the diffuse ownership structure of mutuals significantly reduces the incentive for mutual members to monitor management because their individual influence on management decision making is negligible while the benefits of improved management are not reflected in the value of members' ownership claims.
Because shareholders are rewarded when the firm increases profitability with increased dividend payments or capital gains, shareholders are more likely than mutual members to monitor managerial behaviour. While shareholdings of large firms may be diffuse, the transferable nature of shares ensures that takeover threats act as a deterrent to managers engaging in non-profit maximising behaviour. Individual shareholders also have the ability to purchase enough shares from others to make monitoring of managerial behaviour profitable (see Rasmusen [1988] ). Furthermore, managers may be more prepared to act in the best interests of shareholders if they have an ownership share as part of their contractual arrangement. Given their lower monitoring costs, share owned firms are more likely to adopt superior production technology or efficient management techniques than mutual firms (see Smirlock and Marshall [1983,p 168] ).
However, by focusing on managerial behaviour, Williamson's [1963] expense preference hypothesis fails to account for the possibility that, under concentrated ownership, large shareholders may have significant control over firm decision making. If large shareholders are more interested in short term gains than long term profit maximisation they may encourage managers to engage in risky short term strategies which are not aimed at cost minimisation (see Kohler [1990] ). Specifically, the control may be exercised in such a way as to expropriate value of the firm to the detriment of minority shareholders. This possibility, 1 . Competitive forces within product markets, labour markets, and financial markets can reduce the need for owner monitoring of managerial behaviour (see Williamson [1963] ). For example, expense preferring managers will be threatened if competing firms are more successful, if a competitive managerial labour market allows owners to easily replace them with profit maximising managers, and if their firm is subject to merger or takeover activity (see Akella and Greenbaum [1988,p 421] and Mester [1989,p 483] ).
which is referred to as the expropriation hypothesis (see Lange and Sharpe [1995] ), suggests that highly concentrated share owned firms could generate operational inefficiencies. Indeed, in the case of Australian building societies, the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC) is concerned about the risk of allowing extreme ownership concentration and has included a prudential standard in the Financial Institutions Act (FI Act) restricting share ownership to 10 per cent of total share holdings (see Sharpe [1991,p 71] ). Nevertheless, societies that are unable to meet this maximum permissible share holding position have been given exemptions if state supervisory authorities are satisfied with the strength and suitability of the society's holding entity 2 . These exemptions do not conflict with AFIC's concern over undue risk associated with concentrated ownership since they were introduced to protect depositor's interests and only allow holding entities control over one society (see Butterworths [1995,p 2-3] ) 3 .
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the cost efficiency of mutual and share owned building societies in the Australian context. While agency costs and the expense preference behaviour hypothesis suggest that share owned societies should be relatively more cost efficient, the expropriation hypothesis predicts that these cost efficiency advantages could dissipate if share ownership is concentrated. Our empirical analysis of the relative cost efficiency of building society organisational structures involves a modification of the stochastic econometric cost frontier methodology used by Cebenoyan et al. [1993] and Mester [1993] to investigate the cost efficiency of mutual and share ownership in the U.S.
Savings and Loan industry. Thus we employ X-efficiency measures to determine whether deviations from the efficiency frontier are smaller under share ownership than mutual ownership (see Berger, Hunter and Timme [1993,p 222] ).
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the previous empirical literature relating ownership structure to firm efficiency. Section 3 outlines the methodology adopted while section 4 describes the data used. The empirical results are then presented in section 5 while section 6 presents a summary and conclusion of the paper.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Prior studies have used one of two approaches to examine the influence of ownership structure on firm efficiency. While Edwards' [1977] and Akella and Greenbaum's [1988] approach makes use of multiple linear regression models to investigate the impact of managerial behaviour under different forms of ownership structure on input expenditure or output levels, Cebenoyan et al.'s [1993] and Mester's [1993] approach adopts a cost function model to compare cost efficiency under mutual and share ownership.
Edwards and Akella and Greenbaum test Williamson's [1963] expense preference behaviour hypothesis that, under separation of ownership from control and imperfect market structure, the opportunity exists for managers to maximise their own level of satisfaction rather than firm profits. They use an intercept test to compare either input expenditure or total output for a group of firms thought to be expensers with that of another group of firms in the same industry assumed to be cost minimisers 4 . In this test the coefficient of the proxy for expense preference behaviour, a dummy variable for ownership structure and/or market structure, reveals whether the intercept term differs between two groups of firms. The expense preference hypothesis is then accepted if the coefficient of the intercept dummy indicates that firms thought to be expensers differ in their managerial decision making from firms assumed to be cost minimisers. Most studies using these models find a significant supervision of credit unions and societies is undertaken by state supervisory authorities. 3 . The new prudential standard does not allow a building society to own a credit union and vice versa (See Butterworths [1995,p 3] ).
relationship between ownership structure (and/or monopoly markets) and input expenditure or output (see Edwards [1977] , Verbrugge and Jahera [1981] , Hannan and Mavinga [1980] and Akella and Greenbaum [1988] ).
The intercept test assumes that all firms use the same production technology and that this technology exhibits constant returns and a zero elasticity of substitution among inputs as is the case for the Cobb-Douglas production technology (see Jorgenson [1986 Jorgenson [ ,p 1844 and Mester [1989,p 484] ). However, the intercept test is unlikely to be appropriate as Mester [1989,p 484] argues that, because expense preferring managers maximise their utility while cost minimising managers maximise profit, it is highly unlikely that they would use the same type of technology. In addition, Gilligan and Smirlock [1984] found that a simple CobbDouglas technology was inappropriate for modeling multiproduct financial firms.
Consequently, the ownership dummy variable coefficient in the intercept test could be revealing differences in technology rather than expense preference behaviour. Cebenoyan et al. [1993] and Mester [1993] introduce a cost function model as a means of testing for firm efficiency. They found the intercept test to be invalid for use with firms subject to different ownership structure so developed a testing strategy which derived efficiency measures from a cost function model. The stochastic efficient frontier model introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt [1977] and Meeusen and Broek [1977] was adopted to measure firm-specific efficiency and then average efficiency scores for mutual and stock SLAs were compared. Thus efficiency is measured using the disturbance term, e, of an estimated translog cost function:
where TC is total costs, the expenditure on the m inputs used to produce n outputs, P ki (k=1,...,m) represents the kth input price, and Y fi (f=1,...,n) represents the fth output. The stochastic disturbance term, e i , is the sum of two components such that:
where u i is a two-sided error term representing those stochastic factors which cannot be controlled by firm managers and c i is a one-sided error term representing the non-stochastic factors which can be influenced by managerial behaviour, such as technical and allocative inefficiency. In effect this assumes that any deviation of a firm's total costs from the cost frontier of the most efficient producer will be due to random noise, u i , and inefficiencies in production, c i 5 .
Several techniques have been used to calculate c i and Cebenoyan et al. [1993] and Mester [1993] adopt a technique suitable for use with their cross-sectional data.
Unfortunately, this technique requires strong distributional assumptions, unlike those required for panel data techniques. In particular, the one-sided inefficiency term is assumed to be halfnormally distributed and uncorrelated with input levels. Moreover, it is difficult to obtain a consistent estimator of inefficiency as c i is indirectly estimated making the variance of the estimate non-zero regardless of sample size (see Greene [1993b] ).
The studies by Cebenoyan et al. [1993] and Mester [1993] produced conflicting results. Mester found that, on average, stock SLAs were less efficient than mutual SLAs while Cebenoyan et al. concluded that on average there were no efficiency differences between mutual and stock SLAs 6 . Mester's results are consistent with the expropriation 5 . A firm is technically inefficient when it does not use its inputs and level of technology to maximise production of the output mix. If a firm does not choose the output mix which minimises costs it is allocatively inefficient (see English, Grosskopf, Hayes and Yaisawarng [1993,p 352] ). 6 . While average inefficiency scores could be skewed by outliers, that is firms with high costs relative to the most efficient firms, Mester [1993] does not consider this to be a problem as her finding of lower average hypothesis rather than the expense preference behaviour hypothesis. However, she provides an alternative explanation, arguing that the large number of SLAs which converted from mutual to stock ownership just prior to the period covered by her study were relatively more inefficient mutual SLAs as they would have benefited the most from conversion. If so, this would have decreased the average efficiency of stock SLAs (see Mester [1993,p 280] ).
METHODOLOGY
In this study a multiproduct translog cost function is used to test the validity of the intercept test as a means of comparing efficiency under mutual and share ownership. For this purpose a dummy variable for ownership structure is attached to each parameter in a translog cost function so as to allow the parameters to differ between two groups of firms, 
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efficiency for mutual than stock SLAs is supported by her estimated median values of efficiency also being lower for mutuals than stocks (see Mester [1993, p 279] ). Cebenoyan et al. [1993] do not comment on the effect outliers might have on their average inefficiency scores.
The translog specification for cost frontiers is a second-order Taylor series expansion in output quantities and input prices where each input price and output quantity is represented by linear, quadratic, and cross-product terms 8 . The translog cost function, which is homogeneous of degree one, non decreasing, and concave in input prices, is given by:
The symmetry and linear homogeneity conditions required of a cost function are satisfied when Fuss [1987,p 998] ).
The share of an input in total cost can be calculated by differentiating equation (3) with respect to the relevant input price:
with S ki (k = 1,...,m) being the cost share equation of the kth input factor for society i and g k i a random error term. Equation (3) and the derived cost share equations (4) are estimated as a multivariate regression system. 7 . Cebenoyan et al. [1993] and Mester [1993] use single period data as they argue regulatory changes in the late 1980s for the SLA industry prevent the combined use of data from both before and after the regulatory change. 8 . Lau [1974] argues that a second-order Taylor series expansion based functional form is an effective flexible functional form for cost functions as it allows for parametric restrictions across equations. A comparative study undertaken by Lawrence [1989] on various types of cost functions, such as Cobb-Douglas and translog
A Measure of Inefficiency
A panel data technique, which does not require the strong distributional assumptions required for techniques using cross-sectional data, is adopted in this study.
Moreover, the number of cross-sectional observations in the data are insufficient to be able to utilise a cross-sectional technique.
Panel data techniques use either a random effects model, a fixed effects model, or a two-stage residual estimator model (see Greene [1993b] ). Assuming the inefficiency term, c i , is constant over time and adding a time subscript to equation (3), then:
The two-stage residual estimator model was selected over the other panel models as: (i) the random effects model assumes c i to be uncorrelated with input levels and so prevents the use of regressors without cross-sectional variability 9 ; and (ii) the two-stage residual estimator model allows the cost function to be estimated in first difference form which corrects the serial correlation found to be present during preliminary estimations of equation (5) (see Esho and Sharpe [1995] ).
functional forms, concluded that the translog functional form provided the optimum cost function as it incorporates the multi-product nature of firms through its use of cross-product terms for output products. 9 . Such as time trend proxies representing technological change.
The two-stage residual estimator model regresses firm-specific dummy variables, D i , on the estimated two-component random error term obtained from (5):
As c i is one-sided with a minimum value of zero for the most efficient firm, then following Esho and Sharpe [1996,p 249 ] the constant, A 0 , in equation (5) is equal to the minimum coefficient of the fixed effects dummy variables, denoted α(min), so that:
In order to determine whether ownership structure influences firm efficiency, the firm-specific inefficiency measures based on ownership structure are averaged for mutual ownership and stock ownership respectively. The most cost efficient form of ownership structure would then have the lowest average inefficiency.
Selection of Variables
There are two approaches to defining financial institution output known respectively as the intermediation and production approaches 10 . In this study the intermediation approach, rather than the production approach, is used to define the variables within a translog cost function 11 . This approach assumes a financial institution's inputs are its deposits, capital, and labour while assets which generate return are its outputs. Total costs of production are derived by summing expenses associated with deposits, capital, and labour.
Consequently, total cost, TC, is defined as the sum of interest expenses and operating expenses excluding losses incurred on the sale of fixed assets.
Following Esho and Sharpe [1996,p 250 ] the model uses three outputs and two inputs. The factor inputs for the study are defined as labour and liabilities subject to an interest charge, the latter including both deposits and borrowings 12 . The cost of funds, P 1 , is defined as the ratio of total interest expense to average total deposits and borrowings while the price of labour, P 2 , is represented by an average weekly earnings measure for full-time males in nonmanagerial positions in the finance and property industry 13 . This measure was adopted as it was difficult to calculate a specific hourly wage rate for Victorian societies from the available total labour cost data.
Elstone [1980,p 55-58] notes that societies hold similar earning assets and that these tend to be mainly housing loans and short term assets. This observation was used to 10 . The intermediation approach assumes financial institutions play the role of intermediators in financial markets, accepting funds from depositors and converting them into loans and other assets. Although there is no consensus as to the better approach, the intermediation approach is more attractive for use with financial firms as these firms need to minimise all their costs rather than a particular type of cost, such as operating costs, at any given output level in order to maximise profit (see Cebenoyan et al. [1993,p 157] and Mester [1993,p 274] Finally, in order to control for possible time-specific changes in the market over the sample period, such as government regulations and technological innovation, a time index , TT, is included 15 .
DATA
The methodology is applied to data obtained from Annual Reports of 31
Victorian Permanent Building Societies. Victorian society data was used in the study for three reasons. Firstly, Australian societies are subject to differing state legislation (Elstone [1980,p 55] ). Hence by focussing on Victorian data any effect of inter-state regulatory differences on data can be avoided. Secondly, society data from Victoria includes a good mix of mutual and share-owned societies. Of the 31 societies, 5 were subject only to share ownership, 18 only to mutual ownership, while 8 converted from mutual to share ownership during the sample period. Thirdly, prior to 1992 Victorian building societies operated under a Building Societies Act which did not restrict an individual's shareholdings.
Both time series and cross sectional data are used so as to increase the sample size and efficiency of the econometric estimates and to allow computation of firm-specific inefficiency measures using a panel data technique, the two-stage residual estimator model. In order to ensure an adequate level of data for each society the societies were required to have 13 . There is no cross-sectional variation in P 2 and it was obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics,Average Earnings and Hours of Employees,Australia.Catalogue No.6304.0. 14 . All non-housing loans are included in this group.
at least six continuous observations within the study period of 1967 to 1990. This produced a sample of 353 observations from 31 societies to be used in the final regression analysis.
A dummy variable, EP, representing ownership structure was included to represent the type of ownership, where EP equals unity for share ownership and zero for mutual ownership. As mergers between firms could distort cost data in the year of the merger a dummy variable, MERGER, was included in the final model which took on the value of unity for the merging society in the year of merger and zero otherwise.
Nominal data is affected by cumulative inflation over the study period, and needs to be converted to real data by deflating by a price index (see Hunter and Timme [1991,p 350] ). Unfortunately, one of the input prices, the cost of funds P 1 , is negative in real terms during the 1970s. As a translog cost function cannot be estimated using negative data values this problem was overcome by adopting Esho and Sharpe's [1995 ,p 1143 -1144 definition of adjusted total costs, a TC i , as the product of nominal input prices, n P k , and real inputs, X k , with the consumer price index (1966/67=100) being used to deflate the input variables:
The estimating equation then uses Ln a TC i as the dependent variable and nominal input prices and real outputs as the independent variables, with the output variables being deflated by the consumer price index.
15 . In general a translog cost function assumes that firm technology is constant. However, over time technological change can occur so time is represented by linear, quadratic and cross-product terms (see Hunter and Timme [1991,p 348] ).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS.

Estimation of the cost function.
A translog cost function and one of its two corresponding cost share equations are simultaneously estimated 16 . In order to account for the possibility that ownership structure can influence production technology, the translog cost function was augmented with ownership dummy variables for each parameter. In this way cost function parameters are allowed to differ between mutually and share-owned societies. A likelihood test is used to verify whether share and mutual societies use different production processes, and so by duality, have different cost structures. Thus, with symmetry and linear homogeneity conditions along with cross equation parameter constraints imposed, estimation of the cost system was performed using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique on:
16 . As the cost share equations are not linearly independent one of them must be dropped to obtain estimates of the complete cost system (see Noulas, Ray, and Miller [1990,p 97] ). The estimates are invariant as to which share equation is disregarded.
and
Serial correlation 17 , but not heteroscedasticity 18 , was found to be present when the model was first estimated. To overcome the serial correlation problem, the model was estimated in first difference form, rather than the levels form as in equation (9) (see Esho and Sharpe [1996,p 250-251]) 19 . Consequently, the constant term is excluded from equation (9) as its first difference will be zero.
General Properties Of The Estimates
The results of estimating (9) are reported in Table 1 . Of the 43 freely estimated coefficient estimates 13 are significant at the 1% level, 17 at the 5% level, and 20 at the 10% level or better 20 . Table 2 presents the properties of the model. The adjusted R 2 is high for a cost function in first difference form and implies that about 90% of the variation in the rate of change of total costs is explained by the translog cost function 21 .
17 . The Durbin Watson statistic rejected the null hypothesis of no first-order correlation (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld [1981,p 194] ). 18 . The Park-Glejser test was used to test for heteroscedasticity. In this test, the log of the squared residual was regressed on the log form of each exogenous variable but there was no statistically significant relationship between the squared residual and any of the exogenous variables (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld [1981,p 150] ). 19 . The Durbin Watson statistic for the equation significantly improved after first differencing was applied. 20 . The logarithmic specification of the model allows the parameters to be interpreted as elasticities (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld [1981, p196] ). 21 . However, the factor share equation has much less explanatory power with an adjusted R 2 of only 0.2. The Durbin Watson statistics suggest the absence of serial correlation in the disturbances in both equations, and provide support for first differencing. Structural tests of the cost function support the homogeneity of degree one restriction on input prices and reject the existence of an homothetic and homogeneous production function 22 . The use of a translog cost function was supported by a log likelihood ratio test which rejected the null hypothesis that a Cobb-Douglas model was appropriate at the 1% significance level.
The Allen-Uzawa own price elasticities of factor demand, α kk , and partial elasticity of substitution, α kl , for mutual and share owned societies are calculated using the parameter estimates in Table 1 and the average factor shares for the overall sample (see Binswanger [1974,p 383] ). The liabilities own-price elasticity, α 11 , and labour own-price elasticity, α 22 , are statistically significant at the 1% level and have the theoretically correct negative sign, irrespective of ownership structure. Moreover, the partial elasticities of substitution measures, α 12 , are both positive and statistically significant at the 1% level implying labour and interest bearing liabilities are substitutes.
Log likelihood ratio tests indicate that all the measurements of elasticities of factor demand and elasticities of substitution are significantly different across ownership structures 23 . Factor demand is less price elastic under share ownership as the absolute values of α 11 and α 22 are significantly smaller for share owned societies than for mutually owned societies. These results are contrary to the profit maximising behaviour expected of share owned firms. Theoretically, profit maximising firms minimise their costs and so are more sensitive to input price changes (see Cebenoyan et al. [1993,p 153] ). The degree of substitution between labour and interest bearing liabilities is greater under mutual ownership as α 12 is significantly larger for mutual ownership. Consequently, labour is a better substitute for 22 . Homotheticity is where the marginal rates of substitution for production depends only on relative prices and are independent of scale effects. Homogeneity in output occurs when a t-fold increase in all inputs leads to a kfold increase in output with k being the degree of homogeneity.
interest bearing liabilities in the case of mutual ownership. This is also contrary to the expense behaviour hypothesis as expense preferring managers are not expected to reduce costs by substituting cheaper inputs for relatively more expensive inputs.
The Intercept Test
More important to the purpose at hand, our results suggest that ownership structure has an influence on the cost structure of societies. The ownership dummy variable coefficients in Table 1 are jointly significant on the basis of a Chow test at the 1% level and signify that ownership structure has an impact on the slope coefficients 24 . Consequently, mutual and share owned Victorian societies have different cost structures making the intercept test an invalid means to test for efficiency.
X-Efficiency
Firm-specific inefficiency measures derived from equation (9) are summarised in These average inefficiency measures could be sensitive to outliers and the conversion of some societies from mutual to share ownership during the study period. Outliers may prevent the random uncontrollable component of the error term from averaging out to zero for the sample. Therefore, a truncated distribution of the controllable component of the error term was used to calculate additional inefficiency measures. A 5% truncation was undertaken where inefficiency measures below the 5% quantile were assigned an inefficiency measure of 0, the 5% quantile's inefficiency measure was subtracted from inefficiency measures between the 5% quantile and the 95% quantile, while inefficiency measures above the 95% quantile were assigned the same inefficiency measure as the society representing the 95% quantile (see Greene [1993a,p 683] ). In the 5% truncated distribution the mutual average inefficiency was 29% while the stock average inefficiency was 37.64%. While exclusion of outliers resulted in lower average inefficiencies, mutuals were still on average more efficient (or less inefficient) than stock societies.
The findings may also have been influenced by sample selection bias as societies which had only recently converted from mutual to share ownership were treated as two separate firms. The cost structure of these firms may not yet differ depending on ownership structure. So any efficiency gains expected under share ownership, due to the reduction in agency costs, may not have occurred. In order to overcome this problem, average inefficiency measures were calculated for the 5 societies which had only been share owned and the 18 which had only been mutually owned during the sample. The average inefficiency for the 5 share-owned societies was 50% as opposed to 36.4% for the 18 mutually-owned societies. This result supports the initial finding that mutuals are more efficient than shareowned societies 26 .
to other factors which are correlated with ownership structure. Recent studies have indicated that firm efficiency can be affected by regulation, time, and firm size (see Berger et al. [1993,p 242] and Esho and Sharpe [1993, p 20] ). Thus, equation (9) was reestimated with additional proxy variables representing time and firm size 27 . However, it was found that for this sample of Victorian societies, efficiency was not influenced by time or firm size while share-owned societies were still found to be significantly less efficient than mutually-owned societies.
CONCLUSION
Although there has been extensive research into the efficiency of mutual vis-avis stock ownership within the U.S. savings and loan industry, the particular problems of that industry which ultimately led to the collapse of the FSLIC in 1989 suggests the possibility that the results of those studies could be institution specific. Thus the present study extends the research beyond the U.S. institutional framework to encompass Australian building societies to ascertain whether the results exhibit consistency across the two institutional environments.
A problem, however, in extending the research to incorporate building societies in the Australian state of Victoria is that the relatively small number of societies precludes the use of cross-sectional efficiency measurement techniques which dominate U.S. based research.
Consequently, the present study uses panel data of a sample of 31 Victorian building societies to test the relative cost efficiency of mutual and share owned building societies over the period.
Despite the use of a different efficiency measurement technique, the Australian results are broadly consistent with the U.S. results of Mester [1993] . As in the U.S. it was found that Victorian mutually and share owned building societies do not have the same cost 27 . Time was proxied by a time index and firm size by total assets. structure. Indeed they use different production technologies and have different error structures. Therefore, the underlying assumption needed for a valid intercept test, firm similarity in production technology, is violated meaning that it is inappropriate to use an intercept test to examine efficiency.
Furthermore, the panel based measures of cost inefficiency show that Victorian share owned building societies are less cost efficient (or more cost inefficient) than mutually owned societies. This suggests that mutually owned societies are producing a more efficient output mix and level of outputs than share owned societies and is contrary to Williamson's [1963] expense preference behaviour hypothesis and the principal-agency theory formulated
by Jensen and Meckling [1976] and Fama [1980] . In this theoretical framework, as separation of ownership and control is greater under mutual than share ownership, then mutual firms are more likely to operate under non-profit maximising behaviour and to exhibit greater cost inefficiencies On the other hand the result is consistent with an expropriation hypothesis whereby majority shareholders exert influence over management so as to appropriate the society's funds for their personal benefit. In the Victorian context, behaviour of this type could have been facilitated by the very lax regulatory environment for building societies prior to June 1992 (see Kohler [1990] and Kane and Kaufman [1993] ).
However, there are other plausible explanations for the observed results. Thus Palestrant [1995] notes that most Victorian building societies are small enterprises offering deposit and housing loan services to individuals from a particular region. As mutual firms are wholly owned by their depositors, having a small regional customer base may ensure that mutuals are more likely than share owned firms to operate in the best interests of their depositors (see Fama and Jensen [1983] ).
While this study finds that share owned societies are less efficient than mutual societies, there are several limitations of the research which need to be borne in mind. First, the efficiency estimates in this study involve a relatively small number of societies. As the translog cost function requires the inclusion of linear, quadratic, and cross-product terms for all defined outputs and input prices, with such a small sample there is a large number of parameters relative to the number of cross-sectional observations (see Clark [1988,p 25] ).
This results in large standard errors and variances and reduces the reliability of the estimated parameters (see Gujarati [1988,p 60-61] ). Secondly, the finding that mutual societies operate more efficiently than share owned societies in the state of Victoria may not apply to the other states because of their different regulatory environments. Thirdly, cost functions can only be used to reveal whether firms are using an inappropriate level or mix of inputs for production.
However, firms can also be producing the wrong level or mix of outputs. By bringing together the revenue and cost effects of production, estimation of a profit function allows separate measures of output inefficiencies and input inefficiencies to be calculated (see Berger, Hancock, and Humphrey [1993,p 317] ). Consequently, an area for future research would be to test whether the results of this study extend to profit inefficiency measures. Finally, the use of a dummy variable equalling one for share ownership and zero for mutual ownership did not allow the diffuseness of ownership to be quantified and hence does not account for any variation in ownership concentration for share owned firms. While it would be desirable to employ the measures employed by Demesetz and Lehn [1985] and Lange and Sharpe [1995] to quantify share ownership concentration, that is the proportion of shares owned by the top five and twenty shareholders, this information was not publicly available for Victorian building societies.
